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Abstract 
 
 
Sam Goldman, Capitalism in Ancient Rome and Ancient Greece:  
Risk and Unethical Business Practices 
Department of Classics June 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis compares the business practices of the upper classes of ancient Greece, and 
ancient Rome. Specifically, I dissect the business decisions that were made with an effort 
to increase social status. I will focus on the relationship between the social perception of 
material wealth and the risk or (unethical business practices) that ancient members of the 
upper classes faced when they attempted to increase their material wealth. In my first 
chapter I look at the issuance of maritime loans and the risk associated with this type of 
finance. I discuss the origin of the business, some of the factors involved with it, and I 
look at the aristocrats who involved themselves in this type of risky venture. My second 
chapter focuses on the publicani in Rome and how the system of tax farming enabled a 
wide variety of Roman magnates to become wealthy men, provided they were willing to 
extort less fortunate parties in the provinces. My last chapter compares different historical 
figures and how their business decisions were fueled by the desire to appear wealthy and 
powerful to the masses. 
 
 
I decided to write a comparative essay on both ancient Greece and ancient Rome and 
analyze private business during antiquity because I wanted to test my thesis that even 
over thousands of years things rarely change. I try to highlight the unethical business 
practices and excessive amounts of risk taken by the aristocracy in their attempt to be 
perceived as powerful. This notion has been consistent in many other societies over the 
years, not just the classical civilizations. 
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 1 
Introduction 
We have recently seen many men and women take on high levels of risk in order 
to achieve the most lucrative returns on their investment. Our generation has been 
touched by this conceived notion. In the Financial Crisis of 2009 many independent firms 
and investors on Wall Street acquired a variety of high yield financial instruments in hope 
of earning large returns upon maturity. However, these securities were considered risky 
investments. After the real estate bubble burst, these securities became basically 
worthless, and investors were left holding billions of dollars in toxic debt. This example 
is not intended to be a moralizing lecture on modern economic crises. However, we 
observe that men will take on risk and or participate in unethical business practices in 
attempt to enjoy high reward, and especially to better their socio-economic status.  
With regard to limited government regulation in ancient times, the Greek and 
Roman worlds were almost similar to each other. 4th century Athens, and Rome towards 
the latter half of the Republic, were both hubs for commerce and private business 
ventures. They were truly laissez faire economic states. Both cities possessed a wide 
variety of private business enterprises as well as a multitude of wealthy entrepreneurs. 
Investors could carry out their business directly or indirectly through the involvement of 
private bankers or financiers. Both Ancient Athens and Ancient Rome are prime 
examples of two of the world’s first fully functioning capitalist societies. The Greek and 
Roman societies possessed diverse social hierarchies relative to modern capitalist 
societies. Both of which contained an elitist class as well as middle and lower classes.  
Class was exceptionally important in both societies and in both periods, and this 
notion of class was very highly scrutinized as well as observed by all members of ancient 
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societies. There was a constant competition between wealthy political figures, 
entrepreneurs and other types of businessmen over the concept of status. The ideal of 
being the wealthiest man in either society was constantly on the minds of the Greek and 
Roman aristocrats. It was imperative to exhibit wealth in any way shape or form, via 
buying slaves, homes, ships, property etc. On the other hand, it was also just as important 
to preserve and maintain wealth, as it was to flaunt it. We will see what many of the 
historic figures from antiquity spent their money on, as well as the amount of money that 
they made over the course of their illustrious careers as entrepreneurs and or venture 
capitalists. 
In Athens, the Greek nobility and the Greek aristocracy competed to attain wealth 
through the exploitation of profitable business ventures such as maritime loans. In Rome, 
the Roman nobility gained vast earnings from the likes of tax farming. These were not the 
only types of private business practices that were executed during the respective periods, 
but were exceptionally profitable and controversial. We will also see the wide variety of 
historically renowned politicians and financiers who took part in these types of business 
ventures.  
Despite the high risks involved and or the controversial ways of making money in 
the ancient Greek and Roman worlds, both of the elite classes in Rome and Athens found 
these lucrative business endeavors necessary in order to climb their respective social 
ladders in antiquity. With increasing wealth came increasing power in Athens, and in 
Rome as we will see. Thus, in order to be become the most powerful figure in either 
Greek or Roman society you needed to be of great financial means. All sorts of men 
yearned to be of the highest status in the Greco and Roman worlds, at any cost. As we 
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have seen over time (especially with regard to the ancient histories of Greece and Rome), 
the most powerful and well known historic names that we have come to know seem to 
have been the ones who achieved excessive wealth and capital by any means possible, 
ethically or unethically. 
In the following chapters we will dissect the different components of ancient 
business that took place in both Athens and Rome, including the pros and cons, origins, 
and pertinent factors. We will then examine the similarities between the two periods, and 
how the business decisions that were made amongst the elite classes in each era were 
directly correlated, as well as the reasons that these groups of people chose to involve 
themselves with the different types of business practices. One overarching theme is 
status. 
It is clear, when we look back to antiquity, that there were no such things as 
tradable mortgage backed securities or credit default swaps issued by large insurance 
companies. But there were certainly prospects ofor making large sums of money, either 
by unethically exploiting the unfortunate provinces who found themselves buried under 
great amounts of debt. Or one could have made profits by investing in high-risk maritime 
journeys, which although they were unlikely to be successful, paid off well when they 
were. In both ancient Athens and ancient Rome, being successful financially was of the 
utmost significance. Thus, throughout antiquity we see a large number of ancient Greek 
and Roman nobility who were infatuated with the idea that in order to be powerful 
politically or at least appear so to the public eye you needed to make a lot of money. 
Many of the most influential and renowned historical figures of ancient times truly 
stopped at nothing to make their fortunes. They involved themselves in controversial 
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business ventures that were highly risky and or unethical. This suggests that greed was 
certainly a prevalent trait that existed amongst the variety of successful men in both eras 
of ancient history.   
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Chapter 1: Maritime Loans in Athens, Worth the Risk? 
 
Origin 
We will first analyze the risky business practice that was ubiquitous amongst 
aspiring Greek politicians and entrepreneurs, and then we will look at some of the names 
who involved themselves with these affairs. The first business practice that we will 
analyze from ancient Greece was known as maritime finance. Private enterprises and 
wealthy investors earned heaping profits from loans to merchants and ship owners 
looking to finance a treacherous journey at sea.1 We will examine the origins and factors 
associated with maritime finance in ancient Greece and we will see how some individuals 
ended up making or losing money, while being enticed by the possibility of attaining 
great wealth in the process.  
Regardless of being a lender or borrower (merchant/ship owner) in Athens during 
antiquity, the system of maritime finance was seemingly variable and controversial in 
many ways. However, we can gather a pretty accurate understanding of what this 
relationship entailed through a variety of historical references. Before we get into the 
particular variations, and factors of maritime loans, we will briefly discuss the origin and 
nature of the system. We are certain that maritime loans were prevalent in Greece during 
the 4th century.2 At this time in Athenian society doing business was virtually 
unregulated. There were no stringent policies or specific legislation that dissuaded the 
                                                
1Cohen, Edward E. Athenian Economy and Society: A Banking Perspective. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton UP, 1992. Print. (Pg. 141) 
 
2 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 140) 
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transfer of funds from one party to another at a given rate of interest. The trapezai 
(private banks) essentially went about doing their business without any interference from 
government regulation, and there were no major business enterprises that could strong-
arm other investors out of the market.3 Thus, maritime loans were considered legal, 
acceptable, and in some ways encouraged by the Athenian government. Specifically, the 
process of maritime finance consisted of a given lender such as an entrepreneur or a 
trapezae (private bank) who offered to fund a particular emporos (merchant/ ship owner) 
who sought to deliver cargo in a distant region.4 In agreement the moneylender received 
the ship and cargo within it, as a security for the money funded to the ship owner.5 Upon 
the return of the ship from its voyage, the lender would receive the principal as well as an 
exceedingly high rate of interest. The reasons for this high yield on the loan was due to 
the overwhelming risk associated with the voyage. In ancient times ships were quite 
frequently wrecked in major storms, raided by pirates, and or the men aboard died from 
various ailments. It is quite evident that the creditor himself bore the entirety of the loan’s 
risk,6 that is, losing the overall value of his investment plus his expected return. 
Ultimately, this system of finance was untouched by government officials and or large 
monopolistic companies. It was essentially an open market for whoever was willing to 
take on the risk. For example  
There existed at Athens no single owner of a multiship fleet, no dominant 
trading companies, no enterprise controlling the harbor…Unregulated by 
oligopolistic or governmental controls, Athenian bankers were free to vary 
                                                
3 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 141) 
4 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 43) 
5 Andreau, Jean. Banking and Business in The Roman World. Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge UP, 1999. Print. (Pg. 54) 
6 Andreau, Jean. (Pg. 54) 
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the conduct of their operations, free to commingle ‘bank’ and individual 
funds, free to engage in speculative investment.7 
 
In many ways maritime finance was a level playing field for anyone who wanted to step 
into the game. We can trace many of the fundamental concepts of our current financial 
system back to the one put in place in 4th century Athens. 
    
Factors 
Since we have discussed the origin and nature of maritime finance we will now 
delve into the relevant factors of the system. These factors included the particular 
knowledge of trade routes; the time of year or distance of travel, which justified the risk 
and reward of a given journey, the reliability of given business partners, and lastly, the 
use of financial intermediaries in an attempt to expedite the process. For instance, a local 
banker could be used as a lender’s payment agent, serving as an eyewitness to the 
contractual agreement between the lender and borrower, or he could be hired to hold the 
actual contract.8 This ensured the contract’s safety, so that if anything were to go wrong, 
there was tangible proof of the agreement in the hands of a third party.9 All of these 
pertinent facets within the system allowed for a variety of potential outcomes to occur, as 
we have seen through the development of this ancient source of finance. 
 We will first observe some of the factors related to risk and reward in regards to 
maritime finance. As mentioned earlier, just because maritime finance was considered a 
“legitimate” way of doing business did not mean that it was necessarily a safe way. Both 
                                                
 
7Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 44) 
8 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 178-179) 
9 Andreau, Jean. (Pg. 56) 
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the uncertainty and risk associated with this type of finance classified maritime loans as a 
dangerous investment. These two factors were the driving forces behind the high yields 
that were attached to the individual loans. But this often-high maritime yield was not 
always at a fixed rate, based on a variety of ancient sources. Throughout a multitude of 
these historical references we see a great deal of variability in the determination of given 
maritime yields. This variability in many cases was dependent on the length of the 
journey as well as the sailing conditions or time of year in which the voyage was 
scheduled. For instance, in Demosthenes 35 we see a prime example of how a particular 
maritime yield was determined by both sailing conditions and the distance of the trip.  
Merchants sailing from Athens are to purchase in Mende or Skione 3,000 
containers of Mendaian wine, intended as collateral security for a loan of 
3,000 dr. From option, the borrowers are authorized to proceed as far 
north on the western cast of the Black Sea as Borysthenes. The borrowers 
also had the option to avoid the Pontic area commenced before the rise of 
Arktouros (mid-September) but otherwise without regard to the course 
chosen or time required-then lenders were to receive a fixed yield of 675 
dr. to be paid, in addition to principal, within days of the ship’s return to 
Athens10. 
 
Clearly, in this account the yield was dependent on the proximity of Athens to the Black 
Sea. Thus, the distance of one port to another determined a given maritime yield. In 
addition, we also see the mention of Arktouros (mid-September) in this passage, which 
was the most treacherous time to sail a vessel in the Mediterranean. It is evident that the 
given time of year brought a tremendous amount of risk to the already uncertain business 
venture. Thus, it accounted for a stark increase in the particular maritime yield. 
Specifically, in Demosthenes 50.21 we see how Arktouros could greatly impact a given 
voyage. For instance “Maritime risk explains even the provision for an increase in yield 
                                                
10 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg 54) 
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from 225 dr. per thousand to 300 dr…as emphasized by Apollodoros at Demosthenes 
50.21, dangers at sea from the weather and piracy rose sharply after Arktouros. But these 
perils might be offset by opportunity for enhanced profit following the star’s rise.”11 In 
many scenarios wealthy investors and private bankers believed that the reward in high 
yields justified the propensity of failure for the entire operation as a whole. Some 
entrepreneurs and investors struck gold by gambling on their investments. We see this 
behavior of gambling on risky business ventures throughout the era. 
It is clear that the risks and rewards of maritime finance rendered making 
decisions very difficult when considering a business venture. What made this type of 
finance an even bigger risk, other than the obvious treachery at sea, was the possibility of 
fraud within the business arrangement. Thus, the reliability of a potential business partner 
was also a considerable piece of the puzzle. In this particular scenario we will take a look 
at Demon son of Demomeles, who was accused of fraud by the Massalians.12 “Although 
modern scholars generally conclude that the cargo probably did belong to the Massaliots, 
Demon’s lending and loan administration skills had enabled him to prevail, juridically 
and pragmatically, in all prior stages of the dispute: he had even been able to take 
possession of the cargo and had forced his foreign adversary to litigate in Athens.”13 In 
this case, Demon was accused of taking cargo from the Massaliots and dishonoring the 
business agreement, but was able to skirt the allegations. Ultimately, this shows us 
another extraneous variable involved within maritime loans. Disputes and various 
allegations were quite typical and were yet another relevant aspect involved in the 
                                                
11 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 56) 
12 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 126-127) 
13 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 127) 
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maritime finance system. Yet, wealthy bankers, politicians, and investors still sought 
after countless opportunities to take part in these risky and uncertain business ventures 
due to excessive returns on investment based on exceedingly high yields. 
 In order to alleviate the conflicts of fraudulent allegations and contractual 
disputes, many people included intermediaries in their business arrangements. We will 
now take a look at the deviations of these third parties or intermediaries’ use in maritime 
finance. Naturally, throughout the origin and development of the issuance of maritime 
loans there were issues and conflicts over the course of its progression. Thus, this type of 
finance grew and adapted over the years to cope with specific disputes like the ones 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. The mildly effective solution to these problems 
came with the incorporation of a third party. There were clearly a variety of different 
reasons and uses for the involvement of this particular “third party”. One example of its 
uses in this genre of finance is given in Demosthenes 34. In this particular passage there 
is specific reference to a third party being used as a witness. That is, the witness’ role was 
to observe the overall contractual agreement. In many cases a witness helped to clarify 
the logistical details of the contract, so that if one person alleged to have been cheated or 
slandered in regards to the stipulations of the contract, the witness could be summoned to 
give testimony (Phormion, the banker of Piraeus For instance): 
Phormion’s function as a ‘witness’ to the Maritime loan contract should 
not be confused with the passive role of modern witnesses to the 
commercial agreements, whose principal, often exclusive task is to 
confirm in writing the fact of execution of a written contract. The 
Athenian witness orally makes confirmatory declarations as to the 
contents of the document, and the making of these declarations is noted at 
the end of the writing.14  
                                                
14 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 178) 
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Once again this proves the use of the third party involvement in this type of financing. It 
helps to distinguish the adaptation of the system over the course of the years in ancient 
Greece. Specifically, this particular passage points to the dynamic of the oral testimony 
as a witness of a maritime loan contract, which helped to ensure the validity of the 
document’s information. This was considered to be a more effective approach rather than 
the role of modern witnesses who passively observe contracts without giving a verbal 
statement. But this was not the only way third parties were utilized in maritime finance in 
ancient Greece.  
In Demosthenes 33, in order to confirm that a particular loan was given and was 
required to be repaid we see another dimension of the third party. Even though the overall 
intention of the presence of the party was congruent to that of the prior example, this 
account of the third party slightly differs. For instance, 
This public procedure necessarily rendered visible funds that had been 
held as ‘invisible assets.’ Since borrowers would seek similar public 
knowledge of repayment, return of monies generally occurred before an 
assemblage of onlookers: the bank loan of 3,000 dr. in Demosthenes 33, 
for example was repaid before a large crowd, which also witnessed the 
destruction of the relevant loan documentation.15 
  
This excerpt from Demosthenes 33 confirms that the involved party was not just one 
individual banker or a private financier. Rather, it was in fact a large crowd of people that 
was summoned to help expedite the process and incentivize the repayment of the loan 
with interest. By gathering a large assembly of people to observe the repayment, it helped 
to alleviate any conflict or complication between the borrower and lender. That is, it 
                                                
15 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 206) 
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would be very difficult for anyone to lie or fabricate details of an agreement after having 
been witnessed by more than one person.  
It is clear that this aspect of maritime finance was far from uniform and had its 
fair share of loopholes and uncertainties. Yet, in these scenarios the different roles of the 
third party all helped to ensure the “efficiency” and “integrity” of the agreement between 
borrower and lender in maritime finance. However, these third parties were not always 
present in the transactions in maritime finance and were essentially useless if the ship did 
not return from its voyage.  
   
 
Demosthenes 
 We have observed through a variety of historical texts that the ancient Greek 
upper classes enjoyed lifestyles that were both decadent and luxurious. Demosthenes may 
certainly be included in this group of renowned Greek aristocrats. Known to many as a 
philosopher, statesman, and orator, Demosthenes was also amongst the elite class of 
wealthy-businessmen in Greece. He like other entrepreneurs earned his fortune in 
business practices that involved the incurring of large debts at high risk. Specifically, 
Demosthenes was involved in the practice of maritime loans, which was naturally 
considered a very risky business endeavor.  
 There have been several references in historical text that suggest the involvement 
of Demosthenes in maritime finance. Political figures such as Demosthenes seem to have 
taken on such risky investments to improve socio-economic status. Improved socio-
economic status in antiquity meant greater power. This excerpt suggests that 
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Demosthenes and his relative Demon engaged in maritime finance just as their respective 
father’s had once done before them. For instance 
Demon’s father himself was a bank proprietor involved in making 
maritime loans; Demosthenes’ father employed banks as intermediaries 
for deposits utilized for maritime loans. The two sons appear to have 
continued their fathers’ practices. Demon, possibly a banker, may in any 
event have utilized bank funds in maritime loans. Even more than his 
businessman-father, Demosthenes would have needed intermediaries in 
making the maritime loans attributed to him by Hypereides.16 
 
Evidently, Demosthenes was involved with lending to maritime merchants and ship-
owners in attempt to earn hefty returns of capital much like his father. Although this 
passage suggests that Demosthenes could very well have benefited from intermediaries in 
maritime finance it also indicates that he and his relative Demon were very much 
beneficiaries of this process.  
Demosthenes’ involvement in maritime loans as well as the inheritance of his 
father’s fortune certainly aided in his political ambitions in Greece. With great wealth 
came great power in Athens, and as a result of the great risk Demosthenes bore through 
his crediting of maritime loans, he became a man of great means. For instance  
From the time of his entrance into politics, Demosthenes was a man of 
considerable wealth, like his father among the wealthiest in the city; and in 
what we know of it, his fortune, like his father’s, was quite mixed. But 
fundamentally different from his father, the younger Demosthenes from 
the start committed himself to the public arena, was actively engaged in 
politics, conducting himself in the manner of the economic and political 
elite.17 
 
                                                
16 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 172) 
17 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 172) 
 Burke, Edmund The Early Political Speeches of Demosthenes: Elite Bias in the 
Response to Economic Crisis Classical Antiquity, Vol. 21, No. 2 (October 2002), pp. 
165-193. Web. (Pg. 187) 
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This passage illustrates Demosthenes’ affluence as a young man, as well as his desire to 
achieve political success in Greece. Although Demosthenes’ wealth was not solely 
accumulated through maritime finance it certainly made up a sizable portion of his assets. 
This goes to show that men of the elite class would make highly risky business decisions 
in attempt to increase their capital. Additionally, this passage highlights Demosthenes’ 
desire to excel in the political arena. This aspiration was undoubtedly made capable by 
his private financial successes. Something that a man of meager means could not by any 
means wish to do. Thus if it be political or social, status was very much reliant on the 
prospect of obtaining wealth. 
 
Pasion 
 Pasion is an unusual member of the Greek aristocracy in that he was not born into 
a family of means. The peculiarity of Pasion’s story is that he was born a slave and 
eventually achieved his freedom and citizenship.18 Pasion’s background is much different 
from many of the other members of the Greek aristocracy, such as Demosthenes who was 
born into considerable wealth due to his father’s successes. Pasion was a famous Greek 
banker from the Piraeus, and was known at his time as one of the wealthiest men in all of 
Athens.19 He attained a sizable portion of his fortune through the development of his 
bank. He was involved with a variety of different lending practices, and was a major 
advocate and beneficiary of maritime lending. We will see how Pasion profited 
handsomely from maritime lending over his illustrious career, and we will see how the 
                                                
18 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 131) 
19 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 130) 
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risky lending that he took part in allowed him to become one of the wealthiest men in all 
of Greece.  
 Pasion and his bank played a pivotal role in much of the private business that took 
place in 4th century Greece. Specifically, Pasion was instrumental in the execution of a 
majority of the maritime commerce throughout Greece. Unlike many other businessmen 
in antiquity who carried out most of their business endeavors from within the city Agora 
in Athens, Pasion completed his financial transactions from Piraeus Harbor.20 This was a 
strategic location for Pasion to establish and maintain beneficial business relationships 
with many of the merchants and ship owners coming in and out of Greece. Pasion was a 
seemingly convenient choice for funding these long treacherous journeys at sea, due to 
his willingness to take on great risk and his ability to support merchants with vast capital. 
For instance  
All of the merchants engaged in overseas trade (emporoi) were said to be 
his banking clients. He maintained overseas representation at Tenedos 
(Dem. 50.56) and at Lampsakos (Dem. 50.56). He is known to have 
disposed of financial resources at Peparethos (Dem. 45.28). He was 
capable of repaying huge sums at the far reaches of the Black Sea (Isok. 
17.19). Through his network of representatives, he was said to have 
engaged in banking transactions throughout ‘Hellas’ (Dem. 50.56).21 
 
As we can see Pasion was a major player in maritime commerce during his time. His 
great means allowed him to take on the burdens of risk that many of the maritime traders 
endured as they set sail for distant ports. It is clear that Pasion developed a legitimate 
network of business contacts, and as he accumulated more and more wealth he became a 
popular choice for funding when merchants began searching for financial support.  
                                                
20 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 123) 
21 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 123) 
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Pasion’s wealth and his rate of lending seem to be positively correlated through 
different texts. It is clear that the more money he made the more powerful he became in 
the ancient world. Also as his business grew in size he was able to use different tactics to 
increase his clients fortunes as well as his own. Just as modern financial institutions do, 
Pasion was able to pool together different clients’ capital through the form of bank 
deposits in order to fund the travel of other merchants and ship owners. For instance 
“Most strikingly (in view of the fragmentary nature of so much of the evidence), we have 
independent verification for Pasion’s utilization of bank deposits in the making of 
maritime loans: at Dem. 36.5, Pasion’s banks acts as intermediary on a massive scale 
between bank depositors and maritime borrowers.” From this excerpt it is clear that as 
Pasion’s bank increased in size he was then able to diversify his lending practices more 
and more. The diversification of Pasion’s lending was particularly beneficial for those 
involved with maritime commerce.  
 Pasion’s progressive socio-economic climb over the years can be 
attributed to a variety of different factors, perhaps his diligence, motivation or intellect. 
But the majority of his great fortune was undeniably accredited to the heaping returns that 
he enjoyed through maritime loans. The lucrative earnings that Pasion achieved through 
this particular business practice was undoubtedly more profitable than any other business 
endeavor he took part in over his career. For example “When Andreyev’s insight is 
combined with a recognition of the basic landed/maritime contrast permeating Athenian 
finance…the meaning of Demosthenes 36.4-6 is clear: Pasion’s assets incuded about 
twenty talents in ‘landed loans’ (men), but (de) more than fifty talents in ‘maritime 
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loans’.”22 Evidently, it was the yields from maritime finance that made up the largest 
portion of Pasion’s portfolio. This suggests the potential gains associated with the 
issuance of maritime loans. 
Pasion’s path to success is noticeably different in comparison to that of 
Demosthenes and other Greek nobility. However, once Pasion was granted his freedom 
he too became infatuated with the concept of accumulating capital through highly risky 
business ventures. We continue to see this trend coincide with perceived social status and 
power throughout antiquity. Although, Pasion and Demosthenes differ in many ways they 
both were very much conscious of their own status and power in Greece. Demosthenes, 
was more so fixated on his political status in Athens, and Pasion on his reputation both 
socially and economically as one of the best Athenian bankers. The need to increase 
wealth through excessively risky business in attempt to better political or social status is 
an underlying theme that we see again in this account of Pasion. 
     
 
Phormion 
Phormion of Piraeus is another figure whose account differs from the 
characteristic class of ancient Greek elites. Phormion was Pasion’s successor, and oddly 
enough married Pasion’s widow after he had passed away.23 Phormion resembled Pasion 
in many respects, in that he too was a slave and worked diligently as a banker until later 
achieving his freedom.24 Phormion was eventually given Pasion’s business to run after 
                                                
22 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 132) 
23 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 177) 
24 Cohen, Edward E. (Pg. 174) 
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his death. Phormion headed the bank as Pasion once did, helping to expand the bank’s 
capital in its latter years. It is also believed that Phormion the banker from Piraeus could 
have also been a homonym for Phormion the celebrated trierarch of the Peloponnesian 
War.25 Phormion’s exploits as a financier, like his predecessor Pasion’s were comprised 
of a wide variety of business endeavors. But Phormion specifically enjoyed close ties to 
maritime loans and merchant commerce.  
Phormion like many others Greek aristocrats benefited handsomely from lending 
funds to various merchants and ship owners in need. His involvement in maritime finance 
not only helped him to attain great wealth and financial success over the years, but it also 
helped him to improve his social status in the eyes of the Greek aristocrats. For example,  
But Phormion had come to Athens an ignorant non-Greek slave: his sole 
education was ‘learning the lettered accounts’ at the bank where he slaved 
(Dem. 45.72). Years later, after Phormion had performed enormous public 
and private benefactions for the Athenians (Dem. 36. 55-57) and had 
attained almost unparalleled prosperity (Dem. 45.54 and 72), both as an 
independent banker and as a maritime businessman. (Dem. 45.64), 
Apollodoros tells him in open court that all his success and 
accomplishment were entirely dependent on a single vagary of chance.26 
 
Phormion’s engagement in maritime finance made him highly regarded amongst the 
Greek aristocracy. Evidently his productivity through banking and maritime business 
helped his master to become profitable. Phormion’s successes through such business 
endeavors also helped him to escape his title of slave.  
Essentially, Phormion changed the overall landscape for the Greek upper class in 
4th century Athens. Successful businessmen of all backgrounds could now be mentioned 
in the same breath along with the Greek nobility. Even a slave, if fortunate enough, could 
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become an elite member of the aristocracy if proven profitable. Because of his successes 
through maritime finance Phormion’s name was regarded as reputable and prestigious. 
For instance,  
The rise of a new ‘mixed aristocracy’ joining the traditional Athenian-
citizen elite with influential resident foreigners and even wealthy former 
slaves-combined in fourth century Athens to make possible enormous 
upward mobility for bankers’ slaves. In this environment, a Phormion 
could be linked to the descendants of Solon and to the mercantile-citizen 
oikos of Demosthenes.27 
 
Through large financial success Phormion’s status was forever changed. This goes to 
show how important material wealth was in antiquity, and how status was entirely 
dependent on how much money one made. Phormion would eventually rise in the social 
hierarchy of 4th century Athens becoming one of the most famous and well-regarded  
names in finance in all of Athens.   
 Phormion, like his predecessor Pasion, was not as fortunate as some of the other 
renowned members of the Greek aristocracy who were born into families of great means. 
Both Phormion and Pasion created names for themselves by attaining great wealth 
through maritime commerce. It was through these risky business ventures that they each 
enhanced their social standing in Athens. In many ways this was the sole motivation for 
most men in Greece. As we can see, the desire to achieve more and more wealth in order 
to improve social status was heavily dependent on risky business practices such as 
maritime lending. 
We can gather from the variety of historical accounts that maritime loans were 
controversial ways of doing business because of the immense levels of risk that were 
involved in the process. But due to the potential prospect of earning great sums of money, 
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many entrepreneurs, private bankers, and politicians were seemingly drawn to the 
concept. They could all enjoy vast profits upon the return of a ship from a given port or 
harbor. Many of the factors involved in this type of finance encouraged large payouts for 
creditors, and or great disappointment in the destruction or raiding of an invested ship.  
But the consequences and risks associated with maritime loans did not scare away 
investors. In some cases the risk actually enticed certain bankers and financiers into 
investment. Members of the Greek elitist class such as Demosthenes, Pasion, and 
Phormion were all greatly attracted to maritime finance. Thus, we can infer that men have 
been attracted to risk and challenge as we look back to antiquity. We have also gathered 
that the reasons for these business decisions were mainly based on the improvement of 
one’s own social status. The enjoyment of large treasures and earnings by wealthy 
aristocrats in ancient Greece certainly set the stage for many other future societies to 
come. One in particular would be the next great Mediterranean empire of Rome. 
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Chapter 2: The World’s First Financial Companies? 
 As Rome grew larger, and obtained more and more distant provinces, groups of 
people began pooling together resources and capital and began buying debt. These groups 
were essentially structured like the financial companies that we see today. The 
individuals who “farmed” debt from others via contract were known as the publicani.28 
As the years went on, the organizations of the publicani grew more complex and 
eventually grew to resemble modern day corporations, with individuals given the 
opportunity to buy shares or partes, thus acting as shareholders. The tax companies also 
developed mid to upper level management with a magister and a pro magistro. The 
magister acted as the chief executive officer and the pro magistro represented those in 
charged of the business in the provinces.29 However, we will see that it was not just any 
average Roman who took part in this type of business. Many well known Roman 
politicians felt as if opulence was the most essential piece to their façade as powerful 
Roman aristocrats. We see this trend constantly over the progression of the Roman 
Empire. Material wealth was equivalent to social superiority. This explains the reasons 
why names such as Cicero, Pompey, Crassus, and Verres were all involved with the 
publicani’s system. Many believe that the means to the Roman nobility’s political and 
financial successes was in some way or another traced back to the publicani. We will 
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now look at the publicani, and the reasons why some of the most renowned Roman 
names were affiliated with them. 
 
Origin and Factors of “Tax Farming” 
Before we discuss the accounts that link each, Cicero, Pompey, Crassus, and 
Verres, to this process we will look at the components that helped make this “tax 
farming” system one of the most marvelous spectacles in all of ancient business. The first 
factor was the rapid rate at which the Roman Republic conquered and annexed distant 
lands. The extensive rule of the Roman Republic was a major piece of the puzzle in 
regard to the collection and repayment of debt. In many cases, it helped enhance the 
profitability of private commerce through its newly acquired territories. For instance “By 
133 B.C. lands added to the republic included Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Epirus (Albania), 
northern Italy up to the Alps, Spain, Greece, and Egypt.”30 The provinces in these lands 
were forced to pay tax, and the publicani quickly capitalized on the potential business 
venture by buying up the debt at high yields. However, the gains of the publicani from 
the expansion of Roman borders did not stop there. The publicani could go one step 
further and buy contracts for public works projects within various provinces. For example  
Its rise was stimulated by the Roman practice of depending as much as 
possible upon individual initiative for the conduct of public business... By 
the middle of the second century B.C., contracts were let for the 
construction of public works of various sorts, the operation of the Spanish 
and re-opened Macedonian mines, the collections of rentals from public 
lands in Italy and of harbor dues in Italy, Sicily, and Spain.31 
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Essentially, the publicani could also profit from “public business” as mentioned above. 
The shareholders were capable of profiting from the routine business that occurred 
everyday in these territories.  
 In the early stages of the publicani system there was an additional component that 
enticed investors. Because there could be such large groups of investors in one company 
with individual shares, it was an affordable enterprise. People pooled together sums of 
capital and resources allowing the collective group to take on the heavy burden and risks 
associated with debt in the contract. Thus, in theory each individual was only paying a 
modest sum. “Persons who undertook such contracts were called publicans (publicani). 
Great financial means were not necessary since publicans were allowed to form joint 
stock companies with limited liability.”32 Evidently, all of the shareholders were able to 
hedge risk by allying the capital that they were willing to invest with one another. The 
system encouraged variation amongst the assortment of investors. For instance, “The 
shareholders of the companies of publicans were men of every class-Senators, who were 
forbidden by law to take personal part in public auctions; Knights, who especially went in 
for big business of this kind; and even less wealthy citizens, who found these shares a 
profitable investment.”33 The eclectic mixture of beneficiaries within these companies 
allowed for an interesting dynamic in which very different men could achieve wealth. 
The last appealing component of “tax farming” was that the publicani enjoyed an 
impregnable monopoly on the Roman provinces. That is, the vast size of the companies 
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as well as their immediate ties to the Roman government was enough incentive for the 
provinces to pay their debts punctually.  For example  
Sicily and Asia were scandalously squeezed in the interest of the 
publicans, who had such influence in Rome that it was impossible for the 
provincials to obtain justice, even in the most flagrant cases of organized, 
methodical spoliation. Against these powerful companies, the governors of 
provinces dared not or would not lift a finger. In fact they were often 
driven to it by urgent personal necessity.34 
 
These companies of publicani were guaranteed a return on their investment. Many of the 
reasons for this guarantee can be traced back to the enforcement and intimidation by the 
Roman military, which helped to secure the monopoly of the publicani over the Roman 
provinces. Some may call it extortion, but the Romans called it capitalism. When 
payments were demanded, debtors paid. This dynamic allowed for a steady stream of 
income to flow into the pockets of the shareholders, while keeping the tax system 
efficient and timely. 
 
Cicero 
Despite many other ways of accumulating wealth over his lifetime, Cicero is one 
of the many Roman nobles to be associated with the publicani. Like many of the other 
historic Roman names, Cicero, was very conscious of his socio-economic status and 
made it a priority to succeed financially. Despite his lucid testimonies attacking the 
publicani in other ancient works, we have reason to believe that he was involved with 
them personally. In a number of his dialogues he refers to publicani in a more sincere 
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tone. For instance, in one of his letters to his brother he mentions his affiliation with a 
specific tax company and his affinity towards that organization.  
Vel obruere, vigilantem etiam delectare posit. Constat enim ea provincia 
primum ex eo genere sociorum, quod est ex hominum omni genere 
humanissimum; deinde ex eo genere civium, qui aut, quod publicani sunt, 
 
For your province consists, in the first place, of that type of ally which all 
types of humanity is the most civilized; and secondly, of that type of 
citizen who, either because they are publicani, are attached to us by closest 
ties.35 
 
 
In this excerpt from Cicero’s letter to his brother Quintus he makes reference to the 
publicani being attached to them “by closest ties”. This certainly hints towards a conflict 
of interest between Cicero, his brother Quintus, and the publicani. Based on this 
quotation we can see that he carries some sort of obligation to the company. He then 
makes yet another remark when writing a letter to a quaestor in Bithynia, which suggests 
that he may have been in business with this particular corporation as well 
 
It has always been the greatest pleasure to me to make much of the order 
of publicani as a whole, and considering the great serv-ices that order has 
rendered me, it has been my duty to do so. I am in a special sense friend to 
this Bithynian company... a large proportion of it are on very intimate 
terms with myself, especially . . . P. Rutilius... director of that company. 
.... I also promise you and pledge myself as a result of my own experience 
that if you oblige them, you will find the Bithynian partners neither 
forgetful nor ungrateful. To a fellow provincial governor in Bithynia.36 
 
We have seen his mention of the publicani in these several excerpts in more of a 
cooperative tone, as opposed to his typical rants on their unethical business practices. In 
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Jean Andreau’s work Banking and Business in The Roman World we specifically see 
several accounts in which Cicero collected money from particular tax companies. For 
example “When Cicero went in 51 B.C to Asia Minor; where he was to serve as governor 
of Cilicia, he paused in Laodicea to collect the money owed to him by the State. It was 
handed over to him by tax-collectors. The operation was what Cicero called a publica 
permutatio, a transfer of public funds.”37 This account clearly indicates that Cicero 
purposely stopped in Laodicea to collect money owed to him, before arriving in Cilicia. 
This excerpt displays specific detail, and proves that Cicero was a beneficiary of the 
publicani.  
Cicero, then mentions in this final passage how he has played the role of 
“confidential advisor” to another company in Bithynia in 51 B.C.  For instance,  
I am myself closely associated with the partners in the grazing company, 
not only because I am the confidential advisor of the whole body, but also 
because I am on the most familiar terms with the majority of the 
partners.38  
 
This passage certainly suggests that Cicero could very well have benefited financially 
from a given tax company. In some way or another, Cicero was an affiliate of this 
anonymous grazing company, and felt as if it was necessary to divulge his allegiance to 
the organization. 
Despite Cicero’s previous attacks on the “tax farming” system that the publicani 
implemented, in all of these excerpts it is clear that he had a genuine interest in their 
successes and wellbeing. Cicero’s contradictions in writing about the publicani are 
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exposed as well as his undeniable lust for wealth. These accounts suggest that even the 
biggest adversary of the publicani could have been seduced by the huge profits and large 
fortunes that many of the shareholders enjoyed. Cicero is just one of the many who 
sought to improve his social status and political career through these controversial 
business endeavors in antiquity. 
 
Crassus  
As mentioned earlier, Cicero was not the lone associate to the publicani in 
antiquity. There is a limitless list of names from the Roman nobility that enjoyed 
beneficial business partnerships with the publicani. It is evident that some of these 
partnerships were more discrete than others. One could define the role of many Roman 
Nobles as “silent partners” within various companies. However, Crassus’ involvement 
with the publicani was much more than silent. It is clear in many historical accounts that 
Crassus was an indefinite affiliate of the publicani. He was a major advocate of their 
business throughout his lifetime, and reaped many of the benefits from their existence in 
Rome during his political climb. Here is specific evidence of Crassus supporting the 
publicani  
Q. Metellus Nepos' contemporary law (60 B.c.) abolishing portoria in 
Italy seems to reflect counter-pressure on other tax companies-perhaps 
those in which Crassus held shares-by eliminating a source of profit for 
them, with the same effect as Q. Cicero's tax removals in Asia (Att. 
2.16.2; Dio 37.51.3). In sum, it seems that Crassus' support of the Asian 
company was neither predictable nor ideological, but ad hoc, motivated by 
finance and politics.39 
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In this particular quotation we see that Crassus had obligations to an Asian contracting 
company. His relationship with the company was strictly to help benefit him financially 
and politically. This passage also indicates that “Nepos’ contemporary law” would 
counteract some of the tax companies in which Crassus was a shareholder by getting rid 
of the portoria, the tariff. It also illuminates the fact that Crassus also held shares in other 
tax companies as well.  
 It is plausible to accept the notion that if any of the Roman nobles were to be 
deemed the official “spokesman” of the publciani, it would have been Crassus. Due to the 
frequent mention of the publicani and Crassus’ name in the ancient text, Crassus certainly 
fits this description. Crassus’ addiction to opulence gives us plenty of reason to believe 
that he was an integral part of the publicani and their easy scheme. With such an 
immense craving for wealth it would only seem logical for Crassus to indulge in the other 
beneficiaries. For instance “If we are to believe Cicero, in the case of Crassus the passion 
for financial profit (he was quaestuosus) was a response to his desire to lead an even 
more luxurious life (he was sumptousus).”40 From this passage we can see Crassus’ 
appreciation for luxury, as well as his compulsive need to attain more and more wealth. 
Crassus like many of the other Roman Nobility was infected with greed. This desiret to 
obtain more and more is the type of mentality that we find most commonly amongst the 
“tax farmers.” 
In an additional excerpt it is quite obvious that due to strategic alliances with 
business connections as well as vast manipulation within the Senate, Crassus was able to 
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enjoy great financial success. For example 
One company was already out of the running. Similar tactics could force 
partnerships into being. At the end, when ratification and contract auctions 
were at hand, Crassus would be able to negotiate arrangements and shares 
to assure himself of a profit worthy of his efforts. At the end of 60, 
Crassus could feel complacent…Crassus is often characterized as a 
makeweight, a partner invited to secure his financial support, a member 
who joined under political pressure to satisfy the demands of the 
publicani.41 
 
Crassus was able to scheme his way to his said “complacency” at the end of 60. His vast 
appetite for luxury and power fueled his climb to the top. This in turn also sparked his 
allure of the publicani, and the wide array of tax companies that he felt compelled to 
defend. This passage also suggests that Crassus’ motivation wasn’t solely predicated on 
his socio-economic status but also his desire to achieve political success.  
 Over the course of his political and economic rise, Crassus was a major advocate 
of the publicani. We see the mention of his name in a number of ancient texts, as well as 
many other secondary sources that analyze his character and personality, and connect him 
to a variety of other tax companies. We have explored Crassus and his obsession with 
wealth and luxury, thus making him the perfect candidate for the publicani. The prestige 
of being among the wealthiest men in all of Rome is yet again present in another member 
of the Roman nobility. This prestige was undoubtedly the catalyst that caused many of 
Rome’s nobility to take part in unethical business ventures of this nature.   
 
Pompey 
 Like many of the other members of the Roman aristocracy, Pompey was also a 
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major advocate of the publicani and the systematic concept of “tax farming.” Pompey 
was born into a wealthy family and was known for his military conquests and political 
contributions during the late Roman Republic. Besides his known accomplishments as 
Roman statesman, Pompey had an innate knack for business, and achieved many of his 
profits through “tax farming”.  For instance  
Many of the equestrian order drew large profits from farming the 
provincial taxes. They farmed the customs in all provinces, but their main 
profits were derived from the tithe in Asia and from Pompey’s time in 
Bithynia, Pontus, Cilicia and Syria…Here again it is impossible to 
estimate the sums involved but they undoubtedly were very large. 
Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia was paying Pompey 33 talents a month 
(between 2 and 3 million denarii a year) as interest on his loans, and was 
unable to satisfy Brutus and other creditors.42 
 
This passage clearly indicates that Pompey received his “main profits” from the “tithe 
(tax) in Asia.” Then later in the passage we see that Pompey was being paid a sum 
“between 2 and 3 million denarii a year” from a debtor in Cappadocia. Evidently, 
Pompey accumulated vast amounts of capital through the exploitation of tax contracts 
from various provinces as well as contracts from random individuals. An additional 
quotation indicates that a majority of Roman Nobility as well as Pompey benefited 
immensely from milking debt from the provinces. For instance,  
We only know that debt–surety to Roman leaders-was a grave problem in the 
provinces, not only in Asia after Sulla but in the western provinces as well. 
The enormous fortunes accumulated by Roman magnates in the late Republic 
confirm this impression. Crassus is said to have owned 40 or 50 million denarii. 
But this fortune was modest compared with that of the great conqueror Pompey, 
who apparently died worth 175 millions.43 
 
Here Pompey is said to have died along with his fortune of “175 millions” which was 
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nearly three and a half times the amount of denarii that Crassus possesed over the course 
of his lifetime. This excerpt is the perfect example of the sheer power that the Roman 
nobility carried over the various provinces. Additionally, once the members of the 
nobility made their fortunes, they simply spent their money on luxury items, such as 
slaves from abroad.44 This solidifies the notion that at times, elitists wished to flaunt their 
wealth to the public to signify their power and high social status. 
 It is clear from some of these historical accounts of Pompey that he enjoyed vast 
earnings from the tax contracts that he picked up from the provinces as well as individual 
debtors. It is seems as if his infatuation with money fueled him to incur more and more 
debts over the course of his lifetime. Seemingly, the practices that he engaged in 
benefited him quite nicely. Yet, it is hard to disagree with the notion that his excessive 
accumulation of wealth was intended to portray power to the public eye with the large 
variety of assets that he possessed. 
     
Verres 
 Gaius Verres is another notable Roman magistrate who was involved in tax 
contracts during his reign as governor in Sicily. He was perceived as a controversial 
political figure and used his power to extort capital from those in debt. After his 
governorship in Sicily his fortune grew exponentially. For instance,  
Cicero in the Verrines claims that he could prove exactions against Verres 
totaling 10 million denarii during his three year government of 
Sicily…Not all governors were as rapacious as Verres, but there were 
regular perquisites which almost all took, and most expected to make 
substantial sums out of their governorships.45 
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It is not hard to see Verres’ greed through this passage, as well as his motive to exploit 
others through “tax farming.” Here is yet another example: 
 There is no evidence to estimate how much of the profits of the provinces 
went to the treasury, and how much into the pockets of the Roman upper 
class, but there are a number of figures which suggest that private profits 
greatly exceeded public revenue. Verres, as we have seen, made over 3 
million denarii a year out of Siciliy, and the wheat tithe of Sicily, which 
accounted to 3 million modii, which at current prices, was worth under 
2,000,000 denarii. Verres then probably put into his own pocket 
considerably more than the Roman treasury drew from Sicily.46 
 
Evidently, Verres and the Roman upper class were able to extort funds that were intended 
as tax to the Roman treasury for their own benefits. This passage suggests that many of 
the Roman nobility may have been silent partners within the tax companies. Verres was a 
beneficiary of the tax collection and pocketed a small fortune at the expense of his own 
province and constituency. This example truly illustrates the deliberate corruption and 
betrayal of the Roman magnates and how they would do whatever was necessary to 
increase their own wealth. Verres like many of the other members of the Roman nobility 
used his power and influence to purchase debt, and by doing so was able to profit 
handsomely.  
Evidently there was a large number of Roman officials who were involved with 
the publicani and the “tax farming” system which was introduced to the Roman Republic 
prior to the establishment of the Principate. But some of these figures who were said to 
be great contributors to Roman society and culture were also responsible for extorting 
money from some of their own provinces and constituencies. It seems as if the catalyst 
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for most of the behavior that we observe throughout this era was the prestige in appearing 
opulent and decadent to the public eye. Just as the role of status played a large role in 
Ancient Athens with regard to private business, it played just as big of a role in Rome 
during the late Republic. The concept of status stimulated the aristocracy to make 
questionable choices and decisions, when looking at some of the business practices that 
were executed during this time period. Without the desire to appear powerful and affluent 
to the remainder of the aristocracy as well the Roman mob as a whole, much of the 
controversial business that transpired during this time period, simply would not have 
occurred. 
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Chapter 3: Connections between Private Business in Athens and Rome 
  
4th century Athens and Rome during the latter half of the Republic shared many 
similarities with regard to economic philosophy, as well as private business practice. 
Both maritime loans in Athens, and “tax farming” in Rome were controversial and 
lucrative ways to amass capital. The lenient economic culture in both societies made this 
possible. Rome and Athens became hotbeds for private business of all types. The reason 
for this common development was heavily dependent on the political structure in place 
during both eras. Both democratic governments implemented laissez faire economic 
philosophies, with limited government regulation. This prompted businessmen to loan 
and invest at will. In turn, this created vast capital accumulation for all parties involved. 
There is also a strong correlation in regard to the reasons and motives behind the private 
business practices that took place between 4th century Athens and Rome prior to the 
Principate. Many of the businessmen and entrepreneurs during the respective periods 
were comparable, in that they both wanted to make money so that they could be 
perceived by the general public as powerful and prosperous individuals.   
 
Athenian Policy on Private Business  
In the 4th Century, Athens was a bustling city full of energy and productivity. It 
had a variety of components that promoted its growth in business and commerce. The 
governance of business transactions was virtually nonexistent. The state was both lenient 
 35 
and flexible with its policy with regard to private finance. For instance “These trapezai 
operated entirely independently of governmental regulation or constraint, an autonomy 
highly compatible with the prevailing minimal state involvement with trade and 
finance.”47 Evidently, there was no heavy governmental intermediation during the period, 
which was an indefinite cause for the flourishing of private business and investment. It 
was also during this period that we catch a glimpse of the world’s first established private 
banks and financial intermediaries.48 The success of private finance in ancient Athens 
was heavily dependent on the flexibility that was given to these private enterprises by the 
state. Since private bankers were given the freedom to lend and invest without the 
government watching over them. Capital could be transferred freely between parties quite 
regularly. In some cases, Athenian policy actually promoted private trade and commerce 
within the city. For example, “Athenian law encouraged the import of grain to Athens: 
persons resident in Attica were not to ship cereals to other emporia; maritime lenders at 
Athens might provide funds for trade in grain only if the cereals were to be transported to 
Athens.”49 Thus, the Athenian government was a clear advocate of the importation of 
goods into the city. The government also supported lenders who provided traders with 
funds for bringing grain into Athens. Evidently, the relationship between the Athenian 
government and private business enterprises was more symbiotic than anything. If 
anything, the government shied away from interfering with financiers and private banks. 
For instance, “But the government did not even set standards or otherwise regulate the 
seaworthiness of vessels, their safe equipage or operation, today universal manifestations 
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of governmental oversight. Financial arrangements were subject to no control other than 
that of market conditions: ‘commerce in Athens was never an affair of the state.’”50 This 
illustrates the notion that 4th century Athens was a venue of increasing private business 
and advanced economic progress with respect to the establishment of private banks and 
financial intermediaries. More specifically, it allowed business practices such as maritime 
loans, which were especially important to Athens as well as landed loans (although not 
the focus of this essay) which also created profits for financiers.51 The environment in 4th 
century Athens was one in which the accumulation of wealth was prevalent amongst a 
wide variety of citizens. Due to the lack of government intervention, an assortment of 
business practices were not necessarily monitored, allowing room for immoral or risk 
intensive finance.52 In addition, the advancement of Athenian banks and their abilities to 
lend and hold “invisible” assets as opposed to tangible assets (land, jewelry, furniture) 
allowed them and their wealthy clients to conveniently evade risk and taxation. In many 
ways, the fiscal and economic structure of ancient Athens helped to establish a culture 
where private business could grow without restraint. Additionally, this culture is 
analogous to that of Rome prior to the Principate.  
 
Roman Policy on Private Business 
 In the years leading up to the Principate the Roman Republic’s economic policy 
resembled that of ancient Athens in certain forms. Due to Rome’s fundamental political 
constitution as a republic, there were certainly sizable democratic characteristics in Rome 
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prior to the Empire. One such characteristic was the deregulation of private business and 
money lending. For instance, “Legal texts sometimes allude to the affairs of members of 
the elite, but no more than they do to those of any other Roman citizen. During the 
periods in which we are interested, they were subject to no specific regulations.”53 One of 
the periods that Andreau refers to in this quotation is the late Roman Republic. Thus, 
there was no formal observation of business by the government during this specific 
period. In addition, just as Athenian bankers would lend money at interest, members of 
the Roman aristocracy would likewise, loan money at given rates during the years of the 
late Republic.  For instance, “Shatzman lists twenty-five senators attested as money-
lenders in the last century of the Republic, and Nicolet lists seventeen knights. That 
represents a very significant sample.”54 In an additional excerpt we see just how common 
it was for members of the Roman elite to involve themselves with lending money. For 
example,  
By the end of the Republic, certain members of the two great orders were 
deriving a proportion of their income from advancing interest-bearing 
loans which was by no means negligible. In Cicero’s day that was 
certainly the case of Q. Considius, who was probably a senator. (At the 
time of Catiline’s conspiracy, he was said to hold fifteen million sesterces’ 
worth of debt claims.)55 
   
In this excerpt, it is clear that lending money in order to obtain profit was common in 
Rome during the latter half of the Republic. Another relevant characteristic to the 
economic climate of Athens is that Rome was a city in which trade was significantly 
encouraged by the government. Specifically, the upper class engaged in the importation 
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of luxury items as well as the acquisition of new land.56 For instance “The demand for 
luxury goods stimulated their manufacture, mainly in provincial centres, and trade, 
especially with the Far East, in items such as silk, spices and gems. This trade was as 
under the Republic one-sided, the imports being paid for in money.”57 Evidently, trade, as 
well as the appetites of the Roman magnates helped to bring large amounts of foreign 
goods into the city of Rome. Given the lax economic policies present in Rome prior to 
the Principate, individuals had the opportunity to exploit different business practices. 
This allowed the Roman upper class to attain great wealth, and with great wealth 
different members of the elite class could obtain lucrative assets. For instance, “The land 
hunger of the Roman aristocracy carried further the formation of large estates in Italy at 
the expense of the surviving small holders. It also increasingly extended to the 
provinces.”58 It was the private business decisions of these elites, as well as the 
imperialist strategies of the Republic that helped Rome accumulate capital during this 
period. As in Athens the lack of government regulation with regard to private business 
matters allowed certain individuals to manipulate and exploit commerce in and out of the 
city. In many cases various members of the Roman aristocracy acted immorally by 
exploiting debts owed by certain people or provinces for themselves. Specifically,  
At the end of the Republic, a number of large sums were lent to cities in 
the provinces, while others found their way into private commercial 
transactions in Italy or elsewhere. Whether or not such loans were 
contracted in Rome, the respective sums destined for those two purposes 
were probably for the most part handled by different sets of 
intermediaries. Credit for cities raised specific problems which senators, 
knights, and tax collectors were better placed to tackle.59 
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“Tax farming”, allowed for a wide array of creditors to prosper while many individual 
debtors, and provinces in debt suffered mightily. The culture of business in the late 
Roman Republic in many ways can be related to that of the Athenian society in the 4th 
century. Both exhibited laissez fair fiscal economic structure, both encouraged the 
importation of goods and crops, and both societies engaged in loaning money at interest. 
Not to mention that in both Rome and Athens individual status trumped all else. All 
relished the prospect of achieving wealth (morally or immorally) as a means to improves 
status.  
 
  The Role of Status and Business Ethics in 4th Century Athens 
 The Athenians were not much different than those who conduct business in many 
of the modern societies that we see today. The Athenians, like many modern cultures 
praised the accumulation of wealth, and truly stopped at nothing to acquire, and then 
preserve it. Thus, they in many instances were guilty of tax evasion and creditor 
avoidance.60 For instance 
 In reality, the Athenians were no more altruistic than other human beings, 
and much evidence has survived to confirm their efforts to obfuscate their 
assets and avoid creditors and taxes…The tax evasion, creditor avoidance, 
and profit motivation endemic in other societies were not unknown to 
Athens…61 
 
The Athenians found ways to elude the payment of taxes by concealing their assets 
through banks and financial intermediaries. The primary way in which wealthy Athenians 
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evaded levied taxes upon income, was through loans and bankers’ deposits.62 By 
acquiring debts through loans and by making bank deposits, entrepreneurs and 
businessmen could escape large taxes that were imposed by the Athenian government. 
Bank deposits and debts were a popular choice of “invisible” property because the 
government could not “forcibly” seize the assets.63 For instance, Demosthenes and his 
father were both guilty of tax evasion by tactically allocating their wealth through loans 
and deposits. “But Demosthenes was himself heir to a long tradition of tax 
avoidance…Demosthenes pere seems systematically to have kept his property 
“invisible”, and successfully to have avoided the performance of even the smallest 
liturgy.64” Evidently, it was common to commit fraud in this way. But this was not the 
only way to preserve wealth by skirting the grips of tax policy.  
Another technique that was commonly used was the engagement of liturgies, or 
the “selfless” public service that was contributed by Athenian citizens.65 In additional 
attempts to avoid tax, men would often take on fiscal obligations, and then write off the 
expense that they endured as compensation for the given tax. “The speaker of Lysias 3 is 
not atypical: although he boasts of the many liturgies he has performed for his country, he 
actually undertook them only after exhausting all possibilities for tax avoidance, 
including protracted litigation to avoid these payments.”66 This practice was very 
common amongst generals and military officials who had claimed personal expenditure 
on such political and military obligations. But in most instances these officials committed 
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fraud by lying about their “commitment” and “service” to Athens.  
In fact some trierarchs actually managed to spend absolutely nothing on 
the obligation that allegedly had been undertaken only to obtain exemption 
from other state obligations. As embarrassingly detailed in Demosthenes 
51, the mass of trierarchs appears to have sought to expend as little as 
possible…Even those liturgists seeking special commendation from the 
state are said to have neglected their ships, but not the speeches lauding 
their patriotism.67 
 
All of these schemes helped the wealthy Athenian upper class to stay wealthy. Evidently, 
wealth meant status in 4th century Athens, and the members of the Athenian aristocracy 
were not willing to give that up, at any cost.  
Additionally, these tactics coincide with the risk laden business ventures that 
Athenian investors gambled on during the era. Maritime finance was paramount to the 
process of achieving wealth in Athens. It is the culmination of maritime loans, creditor 
avoidance, and tax evasion (both through said liturgies, or through the allocation of 
hidden funds) that suggests wealth and status were of great significance to the Athenian 
aristocracy. All of these components directly correlate with the notion of status in the late 
Roman Republic, as well as the behaviors and business decisions in Rome during the 
time period. 
 
The Role of Status and Business Ethics in the Late Roman Republic 
Like the Athenians, the Roman elite conceptualized wealth with similar sentiments. 
Although the ways in which they acquired capital may not have been as elegant or 
diplomatic, the Roman aristocracy’s pursuit of money was truly relentless. In comparison 
to the 4th century Athenian upper class, the Romans too praised the accumulation and 
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preservation of wealth. However, in Rome, the aristocracy exploited their private gains 
through the likes of extortion, land acquisition, and unpaid slave labor. In many instances 
during the late Roman Republic, aristocrats relied on coercion by the Roman military to 
obtain their incomes. As mentioned earlier in the essay, the newly acquired provinces 
during the republican era proved to be quite lucrative for a variety of Roman aristocrats. 
In many instances provincial governors profited handsomely by extorting money from 
their own cities.68 For instance,  
Extortion by provincial governors and their staffs began early; the first 
complaint recorded is that of the Spanish provinces in 182 B.C. By 149 
B.C, it had become a common practice…It is impossible to estimate the 
amount of money that senators brought back from the provinces, but the 
few figures which we possess suggest that it was very substantial69 
 
Thus, if necessary, governors threatened provinces with the force of the Roman military 
in order to gain money for their own benefit.  
 In addition to the coercive measures that the Roman aristocracy engaged in for the 
betterment of their own personal finances, they also took part in land acquisition. Just as 
the Roman Empire acquired distant provinces in attempt to extend the power and strength 
of the empire, the Roman aristocracy too purchased lands for their own profit. When they 
did this, native peoples were often evicted from their properties, and were forced to pay 
excessive rental fees as a result of remaining on respective properties. For instance,  
Some upper class Romans also used their surplus wealth to acquire 
provincial lands…Atticus possessed considerable estates in Epirus, and we 
hear of two other upper class Romans who owned large properties in 
Africa. We also hear of a number of Roman landowners in Asia. Some of 
these owners lived on their provincial estates, but the more important were 
absentee landlords and their rents swelled the movement of money to 
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Italy.70 
 
Evidently, by purchasing real estate the Roman aristocracy could profit at the expense of 
the peasants who initially lived on the properties. Aristocrats exploited the land that they 
had acquired in many ways, and often unsatisfied with the massive estates that they had 
already owned back in Italy, simply purchased more. “Not content with expanding their 
Italian landholdings, the rich (senators, knights, and others) had already begun to acquire 
land in the provinces, a trend that probably gathered speed at the very end of the 
Republic.”71 With the aristocracy purchasing these distant lands, there were obvious 
residual effects with regard to the people who had initially inhabited the properties. For 
instance, 
 But we do know that some provinces were severely exploited by Rome 
and its officials, that child-abandonment was commonplace in many 
regions, and that the poor had no economic safety-net. In the countryside, 
in particular, the job opportunities for the landless man were seasonal and 
sporadic…72 
 
Clearly, the aristocrats had no regard for the people whose homes they were displacing. 
In some cases these peasants would actually be able to stay on the land and work on the 
properties as serfs.73 But in other cases the peasants who worked and lived on the 
properties were quickly replaced by alternative sources of labor. 
The acquisition of new property prompted the Roman elites to seek even cheaper 
sources of labor not just through serfs, but also additionally through the importation of 
slaves. For instance, “The vast import of slaves increased the distress of the Italian 
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peasantry. For since slaves were cheap and abundant landlords used them extensively to 
cultivate the estates which they had built up, and the peasantry was thus deprived not 
only of its land but of employment.”74 The Roman aristocracy like the Athenians truly 
stopped at nothing to protect their wealth, even if that meant seeking the cheapest and 
most efficient source of production. 
 Evidently, many members of the aristocracy accrued their fortunes in this 
controversial fashion. But this was of mere insignificance, as long as they walked away 
with a profit at the end of the day.  
It is not possible to determine precisely where the limits of the elite class 
were drawn…These landowning elite members derived large incomes 
(sometimes legally, sometimes illegally) from their political role in the 
city-a role for which, nevertheless, the cost was high.75 
 
The Roman elite class was able to prosper financially through its boundless limits of 
power that reached across the empire. The corruption and greed of the upper class, in 
many instances, allowed for palatial earnings for many. It is obvious that the Romans 
recognized money for its value, and the ability to purchase and execute certain 
transactions. But their philosophy, on wealth went even further past this notion. Wealth, 
and the ability to amass capital, gave the Romans limitless opportunity to lead the most 
decadent of lifestyles. For example  
The point for them was to make as much money as possible. Where the 
desire for profit was not the manifestation of a passion pursued on its own 
account, the ultimate objective would be to increase one’s fortune 
massively, either so as to be able to lead a more extravagant life, or else as 
to climb further up the social ladder…76 
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From this quotation one can clearly see that to the Roman aristocracy wealth was linked 
to the most valuable asset of all, power. The accumulation of one’s wealth was directly 
correlated to an increase in social status. This is what mattered most in both Rome and 
Athens. Additionally, wealth helped to stimulate upward mobility not only in the social 
hierarchy of Rome, but also in politics. For instance,  
In the case of Vespasian, the quest for profit stemmed from the far more 
‘rational’ desire to strengthen his patrimony, the better to assure his 
position in the senatorial order…many senators and knights, through fear 
of not being able to maintain their rank, had tended to launch themselves 
into as many ventures as possible, both pubic and private. It is not 
surprising that such an economic attitude and such a work status should 
have affected the nature of the financial techniques used by the elite and 
also the structure of their business ventures.77 
 
Clearly, by accumulating large sums of money senators and knights could help to boost 
individual status within the political hierarchy as well. The accumulation of wealth was 
one of the most appealing ideas of all in Rome. Growing wealth undoubtedly helped to 
ensure the longevity of one’s political career within the Roman Republic. 
All of these tendencies certainly coincide with the likes of “tax farming” during 
the late republican era, and the exploitation of debts via the publicani. In both Athens and 
Rome, the respective aristocracies made similar business decisions with regard to risk 
and ethics. In Athens, it was by means of tax evasion, creditor avoidance and maritime 
finance. In Rome, it was through extortion, land acquisition, slave importation, and “tax 
farming.” Ultimately, both of these societies were awed by the concept of making money 
to improve status. Thus, the businesses that they conducted were in some ways unethical 
and risk-laden. 
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Conclusion 
 The societies that we have just analyzed, although different, shared many of the 
same characteristics. 4th century Athens like the latter half of the Roman Republic 
embodied the “cut throat” nature of making money at any cost. Men from each era 
seemed to have been infected with the notion of being the wealthiest or the most 
powerful in their respective society. Socio-economic status fueled the desire to obtain 
great sums of capital through various business endeavors. As we have seen throughout 
both time periods, the way the masses perceived particular individuals was of the utmost 
importance. Many of the figures that we have observed seemed to have been fixated on 
the way that other people viewed them. Thus, in both societies we were able to find 
instances in which different men spent excessive amounts of money on material items to 
make themselves appear powerful and successful. In antiquity, it seemed that the size of 
an individual’s wallet was more important than the quality of one’s character. 
 As we have seen in ancient Greece during the 4th century, maritime loans were a 
quick way to achieve great wealth in a relatively short period of time. The risks that 
investors incurred were paramount, but so were the profits that were inherently attached 
to each merchant’s return. This specific type of commerce was clearly a controversial 
way of making money. High yields were offered to financiers that were willing to take a 
large risk by offering capital to merchants and ship-owners.  Many investors seeking 
returns on investment did not enjoy the sight of ships arriving with large payouts, but 
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rather suffered news of wreckage and vast losses of capital. Thus, maritime loans were a 
true gamble amongst ancient financiers, and in many cases caused devastating losses to 
many different businessmen throughout Greece. We have assessed the risk through the 
components of this type of finance, and it is clear that the process was uncertain and non-
uniform throughout the period. Yet, many of the Greek elites felt compelled to try and 
profit from this venture. 
 In Rome nearing the end of the Republic, huge profits were achieved through the 
systematic process of “tax farming.” Many of Rome’s finest and most well respected 
nobility took part in farming debt from provinces, and various constituencies that 
spanned across the extended territories of the Roman Republic. Just as many investors 
and entrepreneurs were hungry to achieve great fortune and status in Athens, many 
Roman politicians and aristocrats sought ways to accumulate sizable wealth in an attempt 
to climb the social ladder in Rome as well. Just as a wide variety of men attempted to 
exploit the lucrative returns on maritime finance in Athens by incurring great portions of 
risk, Roman investors essentially bullied large groups of debtors out of their money with 
the help of the Roman army. In both scenarios we see that even the most reputable of 
names from antiquity could be seduced into making reckless and or corrupted business 
decisions, in the hope of becoming wealthy and prosperous along with the desire to be 
perceived at the top of the social-hierarchy. 
 In Athens, Demosthenes took part in maritime loans, earning huge profits while 
exposing himself to large portions of risk in result. In addition to Demosthenes, bankers 
by the names of Pasion, and Phormion also engaged in maritime finance in an attempt to 
accumulate capital and achieve higher social status. These several names are only a few 
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of the many who benefited from this type of business in Athens during the 4th century. 
But in Rome, magistrates by the names of Cicero, Crassus, Pompey, and Verres engaged 
themselves in a form of business that proved to be just as profitable and equally 
controversial. Through their exploits of “tax farming”, these men achieved great fortunes 
as well as reputability as some of wealthiest and most powerful men in all of Rome, prior 
to the Principate. 
 Ultimately, the attainment of wealth by the Athenian and Roman upper classes 
was fueled by status. The desire to be perceived as wealthy and powerful caused men in 
both societies to engage in endeavors that were profitable, yes. But these endeavors were 
very much risk-laden and in some cases immoral. In both societies, the upper class was 
able to manipulate private business matters for their own personal gain. In conclusion, the 
accumulation of wealth in an attempt to improve status can cause men to make risky and 
unethical decisions. It is a perpetual theme, one that occurred in antiquity, and one that 
we find in our generation to this day.  
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